

Dependent Types for Natural Language Semantics

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Propositional logic - syntax

① Language

- ① propositional variables p, q, r, \dots
- ② propositional constants \perp, \top
- ③ connectives $\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow$

② Propositional formulas (recursive definition):

least set \mathcal{F} containing variables, constants, $\phi \wedge \psi$, $\phi \vee \psi$,
 $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ whenever it contains ϕ and ψ .

Propositional logic - meaning of the formulas

- ① Truth conditions (leading to the classical logic)
 - ① Satisfaction: when a propositional formula is true, given an assignment (i.e. truth values of the variables occurring in it)?
 - ② Tautology = formula is true, under any assignment.
- ② Provability (leading to the intuitionistic logic)
 - ① what will count as a proof/justification of a formula, given proofs/justifications of the variables occurring in it?
 - ② Tautology = a formula that has a proof no matter what are the (sets of) proofs of the variables occurring in it.

Notation

$$a : A$$

may be interpreted as

- 1 a is an element of a collection/set A ;
- 2 a is a term of a type A ;
- 3 a is a proof of a formula/proposition A .

Propositions as types.

Provability/justification/evidence:

- 1 a proof of $\phi \wedge \psi$ consists of a pair $\langle x, y \rangle$ where x is a proof of ϕ and y is a proof of ψ ;
- 2 a proof of $\phi \vee \psi$ consists of a pair $\langle a, y \rangle$ where a is a choice of a formula ϕ or ψ and y is a proof of that formula;
- 3 a proof of $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ is a function/construction that transforms proofs of ϕ to proofs of ψ ;
- 4 there is no proof of \perp ;
- 5 \top has a proof.

Note that the formula $p \vee (p \rightarrow \perp)$ is NOT a tautology in the above sense.

We extend the language L adding

- 1 individual variables (Var) and individual constants ($Const$) to talk about individual elements;
- 2 predicates that can express properties of individual elements $Pred$;
- 3 function symbols Fun to denote operations on individual elements;
- 4 quantifiers: \exists_x, \forall_x ;
- 5 generalized quantifiers: \exists_x^ω , **most**, **few**, **many**.

And we repeat a recursive definition of a first order formula over the language L .

Before we can define the notion of satisfaction, we need to define the notion of an L -structure to interpret the symbols of language L :

- 1 U - a universe (a set);
- 2 an element of U for every constant of L ;
- 3 a relation on U for every predicate of L ;
- 4 a function for every function symbol of L .

Now we can define in the usual (here called model-theoretic) way

- 1 the notion of satisfaction;
- 2 the notion of tautology.

First order logic - many types?

- The idea of having just one universe in first order models originated from G. Frege and is widely adopted in mathematics as it fits well the mathematical/logical practice.
- But there is no problem to have more than just one type of elements. This is common practice in programming languages. Different kinds/types/sorts of elements are stored in different types for economy reasons.
- When we decide to have many types, we need to take care of the types of variables X, Y, Z . Thus we need to consider contexts to keep track of them

$$x, x' : X, y : Y, z, z' : Z$$

- ... and consider formulas/expressions only in contexts, to keep track of the typing of variables:

$$x, x' : X, y : Y, z, z' : Z \vdash P(x, y, z')$$

First order logic - proof-theoretic interpretation


- How do individual elements come into a proof-theoretic interpretation? What would play a role of an L -structure?
- A universe U ? OK, but we can have here also many types $X, Y, Z \dots$, as well.
- A predicate, say P on X , should provide for each x in X a collection $P(x)$ of proofs that the property P holds of x . We can think of it as 'a family of collections' $\{P(x)\}_{x \in X}$ or more concisely as a map

$$\begin{array}{c} P \\ \downarrow \pi \\ X \end{array}$$

so that $P(x)$ is a fiber $\pi^{-1}(x)$ of map π over element x .

First order logic - dependent types



... and we can iterate this dependence relation



We think of X_{i+1} as a family of (dependent) types (fibers) indexed by the 'elements' of type X_i .

First order logic: more on dependent types

... dependence does not need to be a linear relation (left diagram)



but it can be linearized (right diagram) if we want to...

First order logic - notation for contexts with dependent types

Notation for contexts with dependent types

In the notation

$$x_0 : X_0, x_1 : X_1(x_0), x_2 : X_2(x_1, x_0)$$

all the variables types depend on are explicitly indicated.

The statement

$$x_0 : X_0, x_1 : X_1(x_0), x_2 : X_2(x_1, x_0) \vdash P(x_0, x_1, x_2) : \textit{type}$$

should be read that P is a type depending on variables x_0, x_1, x_2 .

First order logic - proof-theoretic interpretation of quantifiers

Existential quantification

If we have already built a type in context

$$x_0 : X_0, x_1 : X_1(x_0) \vdash P(x_0, x_1) : \text{type}$$

then we can form a type

$$x_0 : X_0 \vdash \Sigma_{x_1 : X_1(x_0)} P(x_0, x_1) : \text{type}$$

It should be interpreted as the collection of proofs such that in the fiber over x_0 in X_0 we have proofs why $\exists_{x_1 : X_1(x_0)} P(x_0, x_1)$.

First order logic - proof-theoretic interpretation of quantifiers

Universal quantification Similarly, having

$$x_0 : X_0, x_1 : X_1(x_0) \vdash P(x_0, x_1) : type$$

we can form a type

$$x_0 : X_0 \vdash \prod_{x_1 : X_1(x_0)} P(x_0, x_1) : type$$

It should be interpreted as the collection of proofs such that in the fiber over x_0 in X_0 we have proofs why $\forall_{x_1 : X_1(x_0)} P(x_0, x_1)$.

NB. This is more a quantification of proofs than individual elements. But for both universal and existential quantifiers they agree, in a sense, with the intuitive meaning of quantifiers.

First order logic - proof-theoretic interpretation of quantifiers - iteration

Iterated quantification

We can have many quantifiers in a formula but we need to respect the dependencies.

If with have a type in context

$$x_0 : X_0, x_1 : X_1(x_0) \vdash P(x_0, x_1) : type$$

we can form types

$$x_0 : X_0 \vdash \prod_{x_1 : X_1(x_0)} P(x_0, x_1) : type$$

$$\vdash \sum_{x_0 : X_0} \prod_{x_1 : X_1(x_0)} P(x_0, x_1) : type$$

but we can't form a formula

$$\vdash \sum_{x_1 : X_1(x_0)} \prod_{x_0 : X_0} P(x_0, x_1) : type \text{ WRONG!}$$

Proof-theoretic meaning

A sentence is a tautology iff it has a proof iff the corresponding type is inhabited.

If we interpret types as sets and dependent types as functions, say $\pi : B \rightarrow A$, then

- type $\Sigma_{a:A} B(a)$ can be interpreted as the sum of the fibers of the function π i.e. the domain of π

$$\Sigma_{a:A} B(a) = \coprod_{a \in A} B(a) = B;$$

- type $\Pi_{a:A} B(a)$ can be interpreted as the set of functions $s : A \rightarrow B$ such that $\pi \circ s = id_A$ i.e. the product of fibers of π

$$\Pi_{a:A} B(a) = \prod_{a \in A} B(a).$$

First order logic: model-theoretic interpretation with dependent types

Can we combine dependent types with model-theoretic interpretation? Why not?

Do we want that? Yes: there are dependent type constructions that natural languages make use of (e.g. anaphora).

Thus we can consider then formulas of first order logic in the context with dependent types like

$$x_0 : X_0, x_1 : X_1(x_0) \vdash P(x_0, x_1) : \textit{formula}$$

$$x_0 : X_0 \vdash \forall_{x_1 : X_1(x_0)} (P(x_0, x_1) \wedge Q(x_0, x_1)) : \textit{formula}$$

but we can't form a formula

$$\vdash \exists_{x_1 : X_1(x_0)} \forall_{x_0 : X_0} P(x_0, x_1) : \textit{formula} \textit{ WRONG!}$$

First order logic: model-theoretic interpretation with dependent types

What do we get:

- ① predicates on dependent types;
- ② quantifications along fibers;
- ③ generalized quantifications as easy as \exists and \forall .

Types (applications and identity) vs predicates (applications).

Thank You for Your Attention!