## Formal Semantics in Modern Type Theories

Stergios Chatzikyriakidis<br>CLASP, Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science University of Gothenburg

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## Structure

- What are MTTs?
- Brief intro to MTTs
- Examples of using MTTs for NL semantics
- Conclusions
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## Modern Type Theories

- Martin Löf's TT and its variants
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- Calculus of Constructions [Coquand and $\operatorname{Huet}(1988)$ ]
- Unifying Theory of dependent Types (UTT) [Luo(1994)]
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* Type universes


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$\star$ Proof theoretic specification


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- Alternative foundations for mathematics (Homotopy Type Theory) [Voevodsky(2015)]
- Formalization using proof assistants: systems implementing constructive type theories that help in the formalization of mathematics and program verification


## Modern Type Theories

- Important work on the formalization of mathematics
- Alternative foundations for mathematics (Homotopy Type Theory) [Voevodsky(2015)]
- Formalization using proof assistants: systems implementing constructive type theories that help in the formalization of mathematics and program verification
* prime examples: Agda [Agda 2008()], Coq [Coq 2007()]


## Modern Type Theories and linguistic semantics

- Starts with the seminal work by Ranta [Ranta(1994)] and earlier (e.g. Sundholm [Sundholm(1989)])
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## Modern Type Theories and linguistic semantics

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- Many more after that [Boldini(2000), Cooper(2005), Dapoigny and Barlatier(2009), Bekki(2014), Retoré(2013), Grudzinska and Zawadowski(2014), Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2012), Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2017a)] among others
- How they are useful and in what ways they are different from STT?


## Basic Types: Rich Typing

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## Basic Types：Rich Typing

－In STT，the domain of individuals is monolithic，i．e．one basic entity type（Church＇s $\iota$ or Montague＇s $e$ type）
－Function types for different types of individuals，e．g．man，human are not basic types but function types $(e \rightarrow t)$
－In MTTs，no such restriction exists：the universe of entities CAN be many－sorted
－Arbitrary number of types can be available giving more structure to the domain of individuals，e．g．man，chair：Type（this is the approach by Ranta，Boldini，Luo and colleagues among others）
＊This is known as the CNs－as－Types approach ［Chatzikyriakidis and Luo（2016（to appear）．）］
$\star$ However，this is a choice！Other researchers like Bekki and colleagues working on MTTs，prefer to interpret CNs more standarly，i．e．as predicates［Bekki（2014）］

## Basic Types: Rich Typing

- A consequence of many-sortedness
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MS man: $e \rightarrow t$
MTTs man: Type
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## Basic Types: Rich Typing

- Selectional restrictions as type mismatch: the ham sandwich talks
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- Selectional restrictions as type mismatch: the ham sandwich talks
- Talk: human $\rightarrow$ Prop
- the ham: ham (with ham:Type)
- Functional application not possible!
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## Subtyping

- A further consequence of a rich selection of types
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- Subtyping mechanism: otherwise the system becomes too rigid
- Even things like the man walks would not be possible with no subtyping mechanism
$\star$ walk:Animal $\rightarrow$ Prop
* the_man:Man (with man:Type)
$\star$ Fine if man $\leq$ human


## Different Systems of Subtyping

- Classic case: Subsumptive subtyping

$$
\frac{a: A, A \leq B}{a: B}
$$

- a term of type $A$ can be used in a context where a term of type $B$ is required instead just in case $A \leq B$


## Different Systems of Subtyping

- Record Type Subsumption: a type of subsumptive subtyping for TTR

$$
\left[\begin{array}{lll}
x & : & \text { Man } \\
y & : & \text { Donkey } \\
e & : & \operatorname{own}(x, y)
\end{array}\right]
$$

will also be of type

$$
\left[\begin{array}{lll}
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\end{array}\right]
$$

and also of type

$$
[x: M a n]
$$

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$\star A$ is a (proper) subtype of $B(A<B)$ if there is a unique implicit coercion $c$ from type $A$ to type $B$
$\star$ An object $a$ of type $A$ can be used in any context $\mathfrak{C}_{B}[-]$ that expects an object of type $B: \mathfrak{C}_{B}[a]$ is legal (well-typed) and equal to $\mathfrak{C}_{B}[c(a)]$.


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- Metatheoretically more advantageous: canonicity is preserved
- Long story!


## Complex Types and Dependent Typing

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- MTTs offer a range of other more advanced typing structures
- Dependent Typing
* A family of types that may depend on some value


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## Complex Types and Dependent Typing

- Dependent Types $\Pi$ and $\Sigma$
- When $A$ is a type and $P$ is a predicate over $A, \Pi x: A \cdot P(x)$ is the dependent function type that stands for the universally quantified proposition $\forall x$ :A. $P(x)$
- $\Pi$ for polymorphic typing: $\Pi A: C N .(A \rightarrow$ Prop $) \rightarrow(A \rightarrow$ Prop $)$


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- $\Pi$ for polymorphic typing: $\Pi A: C N .(A \rightarrow$ Prop $) \rightarrow(A \rightarrow$ Prop $)$
- $A$ is a type and $B$ is an $A$-indexed family of types, then $\sum x: A \cdot B(x)$, is a type, consisting of pairs $(a, b)$ such that $a$ is of type $A$ and $b$ is of type $B(a)$.
- Adjectival modification as involving $\Sigma$ types [Ranta(1994), Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2017b)]: $\llbracket h e a v y \_b o o k \rrbracket=\Sigma x$ : book.heavy $(x)$


## Intro to MTTs-Universes

- Universes
- A universe is a collection of (the names of) types into a type (Martin Löf, 1984).


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- Universes
- A universe is a collection of (the names of) types into a type (Martin Löf, 1984).
- Universes can help semantic representations. For example, one may use the universe CN: Type of all common noun interpretations and, for each type $A$ that interprets a common noun, there is a name $\bar{A}$ in CN. For example,

$$
\overline{m a n}: \mathrm{CN} \quad \text { and } \quad T_{\mathrm{CN}}(\overline{m a n})=\operatorname{man}
$$

In practice, we do not distinguish a type in CN and its name by omitting the overlines and the operator $T_{\mathrm{CN}}$ by simply writing, for instance, man: CN.

## Intro to MTTs-Universes

- Universe of linguistic types (LType) [Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2012)]
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- Universe of linguistic types (LType) [Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2012)]
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- Universe of linguistic types (LType) [Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2012)]
- Introduced to deal with conjoinable types
- A universe over which the coordination operator extends

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \overline{\text { PType : Type }} \overline{\text { Prop:PType }} \frac{\text { A:LType } P(x): \text { PType }[x: A]}{\Pi x: A \cdot P(x): P T y p e} \\
& \overline{\text { LType: Type }} \quad \overline{\mathrm{CN}: \text { LType }} \quad \frac{A: \mathrm{CN}}{A: \text { LType }} \quad \frac{A: \text { PType }}{A: \text { LType }}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Contexts

- Context in type theory is a formal notion
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- Various way of thinking about contexts
* List of variable declarations, where variables stand for proofs of the corresponding assumptions
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- Context in type theory is a formal notion
- Various way of thinking about contexts
* List of variable declarations, where variables stand for proofs of the corresponding assumptions
$\star$ A sequence of type judgements
$\star$ Formally, a context is an expression of the form:

$$
\Gamma=x_{1}: A_{1}, x_{2}: A_{2}\left(x_{1}\right), \ldots, x_{n}: A_{n}\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right)
$$

$\star$ A series of types, and a series of proof objects for these types
$\star$ Any type may depend on any of the previous proof objects

## Contexts

- They have been used instead of possible worlds for belief intensionality [Ranta(1994), Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2013)] and also to formalize discourse structure [Ranta(1994), Boldini(2000), Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2014)]


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- Consider the following discourse:

> A farmer owns a donkey. He loves it.

- Following the end of the first sentence, we have:

$$
x_{1}:(\Sigma x: \operatorname{Farmer})(\Sigma y: \text { Donkey })(\text { own }(x, y))
$$

- The pronouns pick variables already declared using the projection operators ( $\pi_{1}$ and $\pi_{2}$ )

$$
x_{2}:\left(\operatorname { l o v e } \left(\pi_{1}\left(x_{1}\right), \pi_{1}\left(\pi_{2}\left(x_{1}\right)\right)\right.\right.
$$

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* handsome:human $\rightarrow$ Prop
- polymorphic for subsectives
$\star$ skilful:ПA : cn. ( $A \rightarrow$ Prop)


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* Thus, from black man we can infer man
- Subtyping propagates through the constructors: if $A \leq B$ then forall $P: C \rightarrow \operatorname{Prop}$ (with $A, B \leq C$ ), $\Sigma(A, P) \leq \Sigma(B, P)$
$\star$ This means that: $\Sigma($ man, black $) \leq \Sigma($ human, black $)$


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- Polymorphic type restricted to the CNs class
- The modification involves an argument which is the class restriction, so $\Sigma$ (surgeon, skilful(surgeon))
$\star$ It does not follow that a skilful surgeon is a skilful human: $\Sigma($ surgeon, skilful(surgeon) $) \nRightarrow \Sigma($ human, skilful(surgeon) $)$
$\star \Sigma$ (human, skilful(surgeon)) is not well-typed, skilful(surgeon):surgeon $\rightarrow$ Prop amd our $\pi_{1}$ is of type human


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- Intensional adjectives: alleged
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- Intensional adjectives: alleged
- A belief context: a sequence of judgments a specific human holds
- $\Gamma_{p}=x_{1}: A_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}: A_{n}\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right)$


## MTTs in action: Adjectives

- Intensional adjectives: alleged
- A belief context: a sequence of judgments a specific human holds
- $\Gamma_{p}=x_{1}: A_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}: A_{n}\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n-1}\right)$
- We can similarly define allegation contexts
- Let $A_{N}: \mathrm{CN}$ is the interpretation of a common noun $N$. Then: alleged $N=\Sigma a$ : Human. $\Gamma_{a}\left(A_{N}\right)$
- An alleged N : has been alleged by someone that it is an N
* Belief and allegation contexts can be kept separate


## Adjectival Modification/Multidimensional Adjectives

- Quantification across different dimensions
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$\star$ Inductive $\llbracket H e a l t h \rrbracket: D:=$ Heart $\mid$ Blood_pressure $\mid$ Cholesterol
- Then we define:
$\star$ healthy $=\lambda x$ :Human. $\forall h$ :Health.Healthy $(h)(x)$
$\star$ sick $=\lambda x$ :Human. $\neg(\forall h$ :Health.Healthy $(h)(x))$
- For gradability and gradable adjectives have a look at [Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2017a)]

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## Adverbial Modification

- Typing issues: How are we going to type adverbs in a many sorted TT?
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- Two basic types
$\star$ Sentence adverbs: Prop $\rightarrow$ Prop
$\star$ VP-adverbs: $\Pi A: C N .(A \rightarrow$ Prop $) \rightarrow(A \rightarrow$ Prop $)$
$\star$ Polymorphic type: Depends on the choice of $A$
* Given that we are talking about predicates, depends on the choice of the argument
$\star$ walk:Animal $\rightarrow$ Prop $\Rightarrow$ ADV(walk):(Animal $\rightarrow$ Prop)
$\star$ drive:Human $\rightarrow$ Prop $\Rightarrow$ ADV (drive):(Human $\rightarrow$ Prop)


## Adverbial Modification: Veridicality

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## Adverbial Modification: Veridicality

- Veridical Adverbials when applied to their argument, imply their argument
- John opened the door quickly $\Rightarrow$ John opened the door
- Fortunately, John is an idiot $\Rightarrow$ John is an idiot
- Non-veridical adverbs do not have this property
- John allegedly opened the door $\nRightarrow$ John opened the door


## Adverbial Modification: Veridicality

- Define an auxiliary object first, then define the adverb as its first projection
- VER $P_{\text {Prop }}: \Pi v:$ Prop. $\Sigma p:$ Prop.p $\supset v$
- $A D V_{\text {ver-Prop }}=\lambda v: \operatorname{Prop} . \pi_{1}\left(V E R_{\text {Prop }}(v)\right)$
- An adverb like fortunately will be defined as:
- fortunately $=\lambda v:$ Prop. $\pi_{1}\left(V E R_{\text {Prop }}(v)\right)$


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- An adverb like fortunately will be defined as:
- fortunately $=\lambda v:$ Prop. $\pi_{1}\left(V E R_{\text {Prop }}(v)\right)$
- Consider the following: Fortunately, John went $\Longrightarrow$ John went
- The second component of $\left(V E R_{\text {Prop }}(v)\right)$ is a proof of fortunately $(v) \Rightarrow v$
- Taking $v$ to be John went, the inference follows


## Adverbial Modification: Intensional/domain adverbials

- Use of TT contexts in this case as well
- allegedly $=\lambda P$ : Prop. $\exists p$ :human, $A_{p}(P)$
- Someone has alleged that $P\left(A_{p}\right.$ is an agent's allegation context [Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2017b)]
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- Introduction of intenTional contexts: Contexts including the intentions (rather than the beliefs) of an agent. We can use this idea for adverbs like intentionally:
- intentionally $=\lambda x:$ human. $\lambda P: \llbracket h u m a n \rrbracket . \lambda P: \operatorname{Prop} . I_{x}(P(x)) \wedge \Gamma(P(x))$


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- Someone has alleged that $P\left(A_{p}\right.$ is an agent's allegation context [Chatzikyriakidis and Luo(2017b)]
- Introduction of intenTional contexts: Contexts including the intentions (rather than the beliefs) of an agent. We can use this idea for adverbs like intentionally:
- intentionally $=\lambda x$ : human. $\lambda P: \llbracket h u m a n \rrbracket . \lambda P:$ Prop. $I_{x}(P(x)) \wedge \Gamma(P(x))$
- Domain adverbs, e.g. botanically, mathematically
- botanically $=\lambda P:$ Prop. $\Gamma_{B} P$
- Intensionality without possible worlds


## Co-predication and Dot-types

- Predicates requiring different kinds of arguments, are used in coordination and applied to the "same" CN argument
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## Co-predication and Dot-types

- Predicates requiring different kinds of arguments, are used in coordination and applied to the "same" CN argument
(2) John picked up and mastered the book.


## Co-predication and Dot-types

- Predicates requiring different kinds of arguments, are used in coordination and applied to the "same" CN argument
(3) John picked up and mastered the book.
- A physical and an informational dimension of book


## Co-predication and Dot-types

- Predicates requiring different kinds of arguments, are used in coordination and applied to the "same" CN argument
(4) John picked up and mastered the book.
- A physical and an informational dimension of book
- The idea is that book is a complex type with both a physical and an informational aspect


## Co-predication and Dot-types

- Predicates requiring different kinds of arguments, are used in coordination and applied to the "same" CN argument
(5) John picked up and mastered the book.
- A physical and an informational dimension of book
- The idea is that book is a complex type with both a physical and an informational aspect
$\star$ We introduce the dot type constructor, forming complex types from simple types
$\star$ To form a dot type $A \bullet B$, its individual components should not share parts
$\star$ E.g. PhY • PHY cannot be a dot-type
$\star$ The dot-type is a subtype of its individual parts


## Co-predication and Dot-types

- Predicates requiring different kinds of arguments, are used in coordination and applied to the "same" CN argument
(6) John picked up and mastered the book.
- A physical and an informational dimension of book
- The idea is that book is a complex type with both a physical and an informational aspect
$\star$ We introduce the dot type constructor, forming complex types from simple types
$\star$ To form a dot type $A \bullet B$, its individual components should not share parts
$\star$ E.g. PhY • PHY cannot be a dot-type
$\star$ The dot-type is a subtype of its individual parts
- A scary slide follows!


## The rules for dot-types

## Formation Rule

$$
\frac{\Gamma \text { valid }\rangle \vdash A: \text { Type }\rangle \vdash B: \text { Type } \quad C(A) \cap C(B)=\emptyset}{\Gamma \vdash A \bullet B: \text { Type }}
$$

Introduction Rule

$$
\frac{\Gamma \vdash a: A}{} \quad \Gamma \vdash b: B \quad \Gamma \vdash A \bullet B: \text { Type }
$$

Elimination Rules

$$
\frac{\Gamma \vdash c: A \bullet B}{\Gamma \vdash p_{1}(c): A} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash c: A \bullet B}{\Gamma \vdash p_{2}(c): B}
$$

Computation Rules

$$
\frac{\Gamma \vdash a: A \quad \Gamma \vdash b: B \quad \Gamma \vdash A \bullet B: T y p e}{\Gamma \vdash p_{1}(\langle a, b\rangle)=a: A} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash a: A \quad \Gamma \vdash b: B \quad \Gamma \vdash A \bullet B: T y p}{\Gamma \vdash p_{2}(\langle a, b\rangle)=b: B}
$$

Projections as Coercions

$$
\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \bullet B: \text { Type }}{\Gamma \vdash A \bullet B<_{p_{1}} A: \text { Type }} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \bullet B: \text { Type }}{\Gamma \vdash A \bullet B<_{p_{2}} B: \text { Type }}
$$

## Coercion Propagation

$$
\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \bullet B: \text { Type }}{} \quad \Gamma \vdash A^{\prime} \bullet B^{\prime}: \text { Type } \quad \Gamma \vdash A<_{c_{1}} A^{\prime}: \text { Type } \quad \Gamma \vdash B=B^{\prime}: \text { Type }
$$

where $d_{1}\left[c_{1}\right](x)=\left\langle c_{1}\left(p_{1}(x)\right), p_{2}(x)\right\rangle$.

$$
\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \bullet B: \text { Type } \quad \Gamma \vdash A^{\prime} \bullet B^{\prime}: \text { Type } \quad \Gamma \vdash A=A^{\prime}: \text { Type } \quad \Gamma \vdash B<_{c_{2}} B^{\prime}: \text { Type }}{\Gamma \vdash A \bullet B<_{d_{2}\left[c_{2}\right]} A^{\prime} \bullet B^{\prime}: \text { Type }}
$$

where $d_{2}\left[c_{2}\right](x)=\left\langle p_{1}(x), c_{2}\left(p_{2}(x)\right)\right\rangle$.
$\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \bullet B: \text { Type } \quad \Gamma \vdash A^{\prime} \bullet B^{\prime}: \text { Type } \quad \Gamma \vdash A<_{c_{1}} A^{\prime}: \text { Type } \quad \Gamma \vdash B<_{c_{2}} B^{\prime}: \text { Type }}{\Gamma \vdash A \bullet B<_{d\left[c_{1}, c_{2}\right]} A^{\prime} \bullet B^{\prime}: \text { Type }}$
where $d\left[c_{1}, c_{2}\right](x)=\left\langle c_{1}\left(p_{1}(x)\right), c_{2}\left(p_{2}(x)\right)\right\rangle$.

## Dot-types

John:Man
picked_up:phy $\rightarrow$ human $\rightarrow$ Prop
mastered:info $\rightarrow$ human $\rightarrow$ Prop
the:ПА: CN. A
book:CN
and: $П А . A \rightarrow A \rightarrow A$
Works because Book $\leq$ Phy •Info $\leq$ Info, Phy
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## Dot-types

```
John:Man
picked_up:phy \(\rightarrow\) human \(\rightarrow\) Prop
mastered:info \(\rightarrow\) human \(\rightarrow\) Prop
the:ПА:CN.A
book:CN
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Works because Book \(\leq\) Phy •Info \(\leq\) Info, Phy
```

- Individuation criteria: John picked up and mastered three books
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and studies in probability


## Dot-types

John:Man
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Works because Book $\leq$ Phy •Info $\leq$ Info, Phy

- Individuation criteria: John picked up and mastered three books
- Every CN carries its own criteria of identity: CNs as setoids


## Criteria of Identity/Individuation: CNs as Setoids

- Individuation is the process by which objects in a particular collection are distinguished from one another
- Provides us with means to count and a sameness criterion
- In linguistic semantics, individuation is related to the idea that a CN may have its own identity criterion for individuation [Geach(1962)]
- Mathematically, the association of an equivalence relation (the identity criterion) CNs
- In constructive mathematics, a set or a type is indeed a collection of objects together with an equivalence relation that serves as identity criterion of that collection


## CNs as Setoids

- CNs are not just types
- Types plus an identity criterion for that specific CN
(7) $(A,=)$
where $A$ is a type and $=: A \rightarrow A \rightarrow$ Prop is an equivalence relation over $A$
- The difference between CNs-as-Types and CNs-as-Setoids
(8) $[$ human $]=$ Human: Type (CNs-as-types view)
(9) $\quad$ human $]=\left(\right.$ Human,$\left.={ }_{h}\right)($ CNs-as-Setoids view $)$


## CNs as Setoids

- Consider the following examples and their semantic interpretations:
(10) Three men talk.
(11) Three humans talk.
(12) $\exists x, y, z:$ Man. $x \nexists_{M} y \& y \nexists_{M} z \& x \nexists_{M}$ $z \& \operatorname{talk}(x) \& \operatorname{talk}(y) \& t a l k(z)$
(13) $\exists x, y, z: H u m a n . ~ x \neq H$ y \& $y \not \neq H z \& x \neq H$ $z \& \operatorname{talk}(x) \& \operatorname{talk}(y) \& \operatorname{talk}(z)$
where Man $=($ Man,$=M)$ and Human $=($ Human,$=H)$ are setoids and the identity criterion for men and that for humans are used to express that $x, y$ and $z$ are distinct from each other.


## CNs as Setoids

- Necessary to consider the individuation criteria explicitly by using the identity criteria $=M$ and $=H$
- The relationship between the Man and Human is one where the first inherits the IC from the second
(14) $\quad\left(={ }_{M}\right)=\left.\left(=_{H}\right)\right|_{M a n}$


## CNs as Setoids: Subsetoids

- $\mathrm{A}=\left(A,={ }_{\mathrm{A}}\right)$ is a sub-setoid of $\mathrm{B}=\left(B,={ }_{\mathrm{B}}\right)$, notation $\mathrm{A} \sqsubseteq \mathrm{B}$, iff
- $A \leq B$ and $=_{A}$ is the same as $\left.\left(=_{B}\right)\right|_{A}$ (the restriction of $=_{B}$ over $A$ ).
- Some examples:
(15) Man $\sqsubseteq$ Human
(16) $\quad\left(\right.$ RTable,$\left.{ }_{t}\right) \sqsubseteq($ Table,$=t)$ where RTable is: $\Sigma x$ :Table.red $(x)$ is the domain of red tables and $=_{t}$ is the equivalence relation representing the identity criterion for tables


## CNs as Setoids: Subsetoids

- In restricted domains like Man or RTable, the identity criteria coincide with those in Human and Table
- For these cases, one can ignore the IC, i.e. one can use the simpler CNs-as-Types approach
- More sophisticated cases like copredication with quantification however need IC
(17) John picked up and mastered three books.
- Double distinctness
(18) John picked up and mastered three books $\Rightarrow$ John picked up three physical objects and mastered three informational objects


## CNs as Setoids: Copredication

- Let us split the example into its conjuncts
(19) Three(Book, PHY, pick up(j)).
(20) Three(Book, InFO, master (j)).
- Note: the CN book in 19 refers to a different collection from that referred to by book in 20
(21) Book $_{1}=\left(\right.$ Book, $\left.={ }_{p}\right)$
(22) Book $_{2}=($ Book, $=i)$


## CNs as Setoids: Copredication

- How the identity criterion for books is determined
- why do we use $={ }_{p}$ in 19 and $={ }_{i}$ in 20?
$\star$ The verb (and its semantics) that determines the identity criterion of the object CN.
$I C^{N, V} \Rightarrow \begin{cases}={ }_{p} & \text { if } \operatorname{Dom}(\mathrm{V})=\text { Phy } \\ =i_{i} & \text { if } \operatorname{Dom}(\mathrm{V})=\text { InFo } \\ ? ? ? & \text { if } \operatorname{Dom}(\mathrm{V})=\text { PhY } \bullet \text { Info }\end{cases}$
$\star$ In order to deal with the dot-type case, we have to define setoids for dot-types!


## CNs as Setoids: Copredication

- Let $\mathrm{A}=\left(A,={ }_{\mathrm{A}}\right)$ and $\mathrm{B}=\left(B,={ }_{\mathrm{B}}\right)$ be setoids. Then, the dot-setoid $A \bullet B$ is defined as follows:
- $\mathrm{A} \bullet \mathrm{B}=\left(A \bullet B,={ }_{\mathrm{A}} \bullet \mathrm{B}\right)$ where $\left\langle a_{1}, b_{1}\right\rangle={ }_{A \bullet B}\left\langle a_{2}, b_{2}\right\rangle$ if, and only if, $\left(a_{1}={ }_{\mathrm{Aa}_{2}}\right) \vee\left(b_{1}={ }_{\mathrm{B}} b_{2}\right)$.


## CNs as Setoids: Copredication

- The semantics for three Let $A$ be a type and $\mathrm{B}=\left(B,={ }_{\mathrm{B}}\right)$ a setoid such that $A \leq B$, and $P: B \rightarrow$ Prop a predicate over $B$ :
- Three $(A, B, P)=\exists x, y, z: A$. $D[\mathrm{~B}](x, y, z) \& P(x) \& P(y) \& P(z)$. where $D[\mathrm{~B}](x, y, z)=x \not \neq \mathrm{B} y \& y \not \neq \mathrm{B} z \& x \not \neq \mathrm{B} z$.


## CNs as Setoids: Copredication

- With these definitions, the desired semantics of our copredication cases are derived
- Three(Book, PHY • Info, pm(j))
- $\exists x, y, z$ : Book. $D[\mathrm{PHY}](x, y, z) \& D[\operatorname{InFo}](x, y, z) \& p m(j, x)$ \& $p m(j, y) \& p m(j, z)$
- Note that this is achieved through defining the equivalence relation for dot-types by means of disjunction of both identity criteria and, then, we obtain double distinctness by negating the disjunction.


## CNs as Setoids: Copredication

- Verbs plus adjectives in quantified copredication
- Consider the following example:
(23) John mastered three heavy books.
- The interpretation needed here: John mastered three informational objects that are also heavy as physical objects
* Both the verb and the adjective have a word on the IC
- First step: adjectival modification
- HBook $=\Sigma$ (Book, heavy) or $\Sigma x$ :Book.heavy $(x)$


## CNs as Setoids: Copredication

- The interpretation we get:

Three(HBook, PHY • InFO, master (j))

- Expanding:
$\exists x, y, z$ : HBook. $D[\mathrm{PHY}](x, y, z) \& D[\operatorname{INFO}](x, y, z)$
\& master $(j, x)$ \& master $(j, y) \&$ master $(j, z)$


## Conclusions

- MTTs as foundational languages for formal semantics


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- Proof-theoretically specified, supporting effecting reasoning
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## Conclusions

- MTTs as foundational languages for formal semantics
- Formally, well-studied
- Expressively adequate
- Proof-theoretically specified, supporting effecting reasoning
- State of maturity of both MTT semantics and proof assistant technology
- Use proof assistant technology and MTTs for formal verification and inference

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