

# Introduction to Dependent Type Semantics

Daisuke Bekki<sup>1,3</sup>

(Joint work with Koji Mineshima<sup>1,3</sup> and Ribeka Tanaka<sup>2,3</sup>)

<sup>1</sup>Ochanomizu University / <sup>2</sup>Kyoto University / <sup>3</sup>CREST, JST

NASSLLI2018 workshop: *New type-theoretic tools in natural language semantics*, CMU, USA, June 26, 2018.

# Dependent Type Semantics (DTS) (Bekki 2014; Bekki and Mineshima 2017)

- ▶ A framework of natural language semantics
- ▶ Unified approach to general inferences and anaphora/presupposition resolution in terms of *proof construction* (cf. Krahmer and Piwek (1999))

## Main features:

1. **Proof-theoretic semantics:**  
From truth-conditions (denotations, models) to proof-conditions (proofs, contexts)
2. **Underspecification Semantics:** A proof-theoretic alternative to Dynamic Semantics (DRT, DPL, etc.)
3. **Compositional semantics:** Syntax-semantics interface via categorial grammars (e.g. CCG, Hybrid-TLCCG)
4. **Computational semantics:** Implementation, Applications to Natural Language Processing

# Dependent Types

## Per Martin-Löf




Martin-Löf (1984) “Intuitionistic type theory”


# What are $\Pi$ -types

$\Pi$ -type is a type of *fibred* functions.

Simple function space




*Fibred* function space




# What are $\Sigma$ -types

$\Sigma$ -type is a type of *fibred* products.

Simple product space



*Fibred* product space



# Notations

DTS notation	Standard notation	$x \notin \text{fv}(B)$	$x \in \text{fv}(B)$
$(x : A) \rightarrow B$	$(\Pi x : A)B$	$A \rightarrow B$	$(\forall x : A)B$
$(x : A) \times B$ <i>or</i> $\left[ \begin{array}{l} x:A \\ B \end{array} \right]$	$(\Sigma x : A)B$	$A \wedge B$	$(\exists x : A)B$

Scope of the variable in  $\Pi$ -types:  $(x : A) \rightarrow B$

Scope of the variable in  $\Sigma$ -types:  $\left[ \begin{array}{l} x:A \\ B \end{array} \right]$

## Π-type F/I/E rules

$$\frac{\frac{\overline{x : A}^k \quad \vdots}{A : \text{type}_i \quad B : \text{type}_j}}{(x : A) \rightarrow B : \text{type}_{\max(i,j)}} \quad (\Pi F),k$$

$$\frac{\frac{\overline{x : A}^k \quad \vdots}{A : \text{type}_i \quad M : B}}{\lambda x.M : (x : A) \rightarrow B} \quad (\Pi I),k$$

$$\frac{M : (x : A) \rightarrow B \quad N : A}{MN : B[N/x]} \quad (\Pi E)$$



## $\Sigma$ -type F/I/E rules

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \text{---}^k \\ x : A \\ \vdots \\ A : \text{type}_i \quad B : \text{type}_j \end{array}}{(x : A) \times B : \text{type}_{\max(i,j)}} \quad (\Sigma F), k$$

$$\frac{M : A \quad N : B[M/x]}{(M, N) : (x : A) \times B} \quad (\Sigma I)$$

$$\frac{M : (x : A) \times B}{\pi_1(M) : A} \quad (\Sigma E)$$

$$\frac{M : (x : A) \times B}{\pi_2(M) : B[\pi_1(M)/x]} \quad (\Sigma E)$$

# Dependent Types prevail



# Dependent Types prevail



# Rules of DTS

## Rules from Martin-Löf Type Theory

- ▶ Axioms and Structural rules
- ▶  $\Pi$ -type (Dependent function type) [F/I/E]
- ▶  $\Sigma$ -type (Dependent product type) [F/I/E]
- ▶ Intensional equality type [F/I/E]
- ▶ Disjoint union type [F/I/E]
- ▶ Enumeration type [F/I/E]
- ▶ Natural number type [F/I/E]

## New rule in DTS

- ▶ @ (the 'asperand' operator)
  - ▶ Anaphora and presupposition triggers (linguistically speaking)
  - ▶ Open proofs (logically speaking)

# Conjunction, Implication, and Negation

## Definition

$$\left[ \begin{array}{l} A \\ B \end{array} \right] \stackrel{def}{\equiv} (x : A) \times B \quad \text{where } x \notin \text{fv}(B)$$

$$A \rightarrow B \stackrel{def}{\equiv} (x : A) \rightarrow B \quad \text{where } x \notin \text{fv}(B)$$

$$\neg A \stackrel{def}{\equiv} (x : A) \rightarrow \perp$$

# Dynamics in Natural Language Semantics

## A theory of anaphora

- ▶ Anaphora representable by a constant symbol:

- ▶ Deictic use:

(1) *(Pointing at John)*

He was born in Detroit.

**bornIn**( *j* , *d* )

- ▶ Coreference:

(2) John loves a girl who hates him .

$\exists x(\mathbf{girl}(x) \wedge \mathbf{love}(j, x) \wedge \mathbf{hate}(x, j))$

- ▶ Anaphora representable by a variable

- ▶ Bound variable anaphora:

(3) Every boy loves his father.

$\forall x(\mathbf{boy}(x) \rightarrow \mathbf{love}(x, \mathbf{fatherOf}(x)))$

## A theory of anaphora

- ▶ Anaphora not representable by FoL:

- ▶ E-type anaphora:

- (4) A man entered into the park. He whistled.

- ▶ Donkey anaphora:

- (5) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.

- (6) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.

- ▶ Anaphora not representable by FoL nor dynamic semantics:

- ▶ Syllogistic anaphora:

- (7) Every girl received a present. Some girl opened it.

- ▶ Disjunctive antecedent:

- (8) If Mary sees a horse or a pony, she waves to it.



## E-type anaphora: Evans (1980)

(9) [A man]<sup>1</sup> entered. He<sub>1</sub> whistled.

The first-order SR (10) represents the truth condition of (9), thus is a candidate of the SR of (9).

(10)  $\exists x(\mathbf{man}(x) \wedge \mathbf{enter}(x) \wedge \mathbf{whistle}(x))$

But the syntactic structure of the SR (10) does not correspond to that of (9), where consists of two independent sentences. The sentential boundary of (9) prefers the first-order representation (11).

(11)  $\exists x(\mathbf{man}(x) \wedge \mathbf{enter}(x)) \wedge \mathbf{whistle}(x)$

However, the truth condition of (11) is different from that of the mini-discourse (9) since the variable  $x$  in **whistle**( $x$ ) is not bound by  $\exists$ .

## Donkey anaphora: Geach (1962)

For the donkey sentences (12), a first-order formula (13), whose truth condition is the same as those of (12), is a candidate of its SR.

(12) a. Every farmer who owns [a donkey]<sup>1</sup> beats it<sub>1</sub>.

b. If [a farmer]<sup>1</sup> owns [a donkey]<sup>2</sup>, he<sub>1</sub> beats it<sub>2</sub>.

(13)  $\forall x(\text{farmer}(x) \rightarrow \forall y(\text{donkey}(y) \wedge \text{own}(x, y) \rightarrow \text{beat}(x, y)))$

But the translation from the sentence (12) to (13) is not straightforward since i) the indefinite noun phrase *a donkey* is translated into a universal quantifier in (13) instead of an existential quantifier, and ii) the syntactic structure of (13) does not corresponds to that of (12).

## Donkey anaphora: Geach (1962)

- (12) a. Every farmer who owns [a donkey]<sup>1</sup> beats **it<sub>1</sub>** .  
b. If [a farmer]<sup>1</sup> owns [a donkey]<sup>2</sup>, he<sub>1</sub> beats **it<sub>2</sub>** .


The syntactic parallel of (12) is, rather, the SR (14), in which the indefinite noun phrase is translated into an existential quantification.

$$(14) \quad \forall x(\text{farmer}(x) \wedge \exists y(\text{donkey}(y) \wedge \text{own}(x, y)) \rightarrow \text{beat}(x, y))$$

However, (14) does not represent the truth condition of (12) correctly since the variable  $y$  in **beat**( $x, y$ ) fails to be bound by  $\exists$ . Therefore, neither (13) nor (14) qualifies as the SR of (12).

## E-type anaphora: Ranta (1994)

(9) A man entered. He whistled.



Note:  $\left[ \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{x:A} \\ \mathbf{B} \end{array} \right]$  is a type for pairs of  $A$  and  $B[x]$ .

## Donkey anaphora: Sundholm (1986)


(12a) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it .

$$\left( u : \left[ \left[ \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \text{farmer}(x) \end{array} \right] \right] \left[ \left[ \begin{array}{l} v: \left[ \begin{array}{l} y:\text{entity} \\ \text{donkey}(y) \end{array} \right] \\ \text{own}(x, \pi_1 v) \end{array} \right] \right] \right] \right) \rightarrow \text{beat}(\pi_1 u, \pi_1 \pi_1 \pi_2 \pi_2 u)$$

Note:  $(x : A) \rightarrow B$  is a type for functions from  $A$  to  $B[x]$ .

## From TTG to DTS: Compositionality

- Q: How could one get to these (dependently-typed) representations from arbitrary sentences?
- A: By lexicalization.
- Q: How could we lexicalize context-dependent words like pronouns?



# Dependent Type Semantics (DTS)

## From TTG to DTS: Compositionality

- Q: How could one get to these (dependently-typed) representations from arbitrary sentences?
- A: By lexicalization.
- Q: How could we lexicalize context-dependent words like pronouns?
- A: By using **underspecified terms**.
- Q: But how could we retrieve a context for an underspecified term?
- A: By **type checking**.



## Underspecified terms

DTS = DTT + underspecified terms  $@_i A$


### Definition (@-rule)

$$\frac{A : \text{type} \quad A \text{ true}}{@_i A : A} \text{ (@)}$$

- ▶ @-rule states that the well-formedness of  $@_i A$  requires:
  - ▶  $A$  is a well-formed type.
  - ▶ the inhabitation of  $A$  (namely,  $A$  is a presuppositional content)
- ▶  $i$  is an index that distinguishes different underspecified terms

## On parsing

We assume that an SR of a sentence is obtained by parsing and semantic composition (assumed by one's syntactic theory).




# Lexical items in CCG-style

PF	CCG categories	Semantic representations in DTS
if	$S/S/S$	$\lambda p.\lambda q.(u : p) \rightarrow q$
every <sub>nom</sub>	$S/(S \setminus NP)/N$	$\lambda n.\lambda p.\left(u : \begin{bmatrix} x:\text{entity} \\ nx \end{bmatrix}\right) \rightarrow p(\pi_1(u))$
every <sub>acc</sub>	$T \setminus (T/NP)/N$	$\lambda n.\lambda p.\lambda \vec{x}.\left(v : \begin{bmatrix} y:\text{entity} \\ ny \end{bmatrix}\right) \rightarrow p(\pi_1(v))\vec{x}$
a <sub>nom</sub> , some <sub>nom</sub>	$S/(S \setminus NP)/N$	$\lambda n.\lambda p.\left[\begin{array}{l} u : \begin{bmatrix} x:\text{entity} \\ nx \end{bmatrix} \\ p(\pi_1(u)) \end{array}\right]$
a <sub>acc</sub> , some <sub>acc</sub>	$T \setminus (T/NP)/N$	$\lambda n.\lambda p.\lambda \vec{x}.\left[\begin{array}{l} v : \begin{bmatrix} y:\text{entity} \\ ny \end{bmatrix} \\ p(\pi_1(v))\vec{x} \end{array}\right]$
farmer	$N$	<b>farmer</b>
donkey	$N$	<b>donkey</b>
who	$N \setminus N/(S \setminus NP)$	$\lambda p.\lambda n.\lambda x.\left[\begin{array}{l} nx \\ px \end{array}\right]$
whom	$N \setminus N/(S/NP)$	$\lambda p.\lambda n.\lambda x.\left[\begin{array}{l} nx \\ px \end{array}\right]$
owns	$S \setminus NP/NP$	<b>own</b>
beats	$S \setminus NP/NP$	<b>beat</b>
he <sub>i</sub>	$NP$	$\pi_1\left(\begin{array}{l} @_i \begin{bmatrix} x:\text{entity} \\ \text{male}(x) \end{bmatrix} \end{array}\right)$
it <sub>i</sub>	$NP$	$\pi_1\left(\begin{array}{l} @_i \begin{bmatrix} x:\text{entity} \\ \neg\text{human}(x) \end{bmatrix} \end{array}\right)$
the <sub>i</sub>	$NP/N$	$\lambda n.\pi_1\left(\begin{array}{l} @_i \begin{bmatrix} x:\text{entity} \\ nx \end{bmatrix} \end{array}\right)$


# Lexical items in CCG-style (anaphoric expressions)

PF	CCG categories	Semantic representations in DTS
$he_i$	$NP$	$\pi_1 \left( @_i \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \text{male}(x) \end{array} \right] \right)$
$it_i$	$NP$	$\pi_1 \left( @_i \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \neg\text{human}(x) \end{array} \right] \right)$
$the_i$	$NP/N$	$\lambda n.\pi_1 \left( @_i \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ nx \end{array} \right] \right)$

# E-type anaphora: Parsing



# E-type anaphora: Parsing



# Progressive conjunction: Ranta (1994)

## Definition (Progressive conjunction)

$$M; N \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left[ \begin{array}{l} u:M \\ N \end{array} \right] \quad \text{where } u \notin \text{fv}(N)$$

(9) [A man]<sub>1</sub> entered. He<sub>1</sub> whistled.

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{man}(x) \\ \text{enter}(x) \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right]; \text{whistle}(\pi_1 @_1 \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \text{male}(x) \end{array} \right]) \\
 = & \left[ \begin{array}{l} u: \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{man}(x) \\ \text{enter}(x) \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right] \\ \text{whistle}(\pi_1 @_1 \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \text{male}(x) \end{array} \right]) \end{array} \right]
 \end{aligned}$$





# E-type anaphora: Proof search

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{}{v : \left[ \begin{array}{l} u : [x:\text{entity}] \\ \text{man}(x) \\ \text{enter}(\pi_1 u) \end{array} \right]}^1 \quad (\Sigma E) \\
 \hline
 \frac{}{\pi_1 v : \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \text{man}(x) \end{array} \right]} \quad (\Sigma E) \\
 \hline
 \pi_1 \pi_1 v : \text{entity} \quad (\Sigma E)
 \end{array}
 \quad
 \begin{array}{c}
 \frac{}{v : \left[ \begin{array}{l} u : [x:\text{entity}] \\ \text{man}(x) \\ \text{enter}(\pi_1 u) \end{array} \right]}^1 \quad (\Sigma E) \\
 \hline
 \frac{}{\pi_1 v : \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \text{man}(x) \end{array} \right]} \quad (\Sigma E) \\
 \hline
 m : \left( u : \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \text{man}(x) \end{array} \right] \right) \rightarrow \text{male}(\pi_1 u) \quad (CON) \\
 \hline
 m(\pi_1 v) : \text{male}(\pi_1 \pi_1 v) \quad (\Sigma E) \\
 \hline
 (\pi_1 \pi_1 v, m(\pi_1 v)) : \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \text{male}(x) \end{array} \right] \quad (IE)
 \end{array}$$



# @-elimination rules

Definition (@-elimination rules (excerpt))

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_M}{A : s \quad M : A'}_{\textcircled{i} A : A} \textcircled{(\textcircled{a})} \right] = M : A'$$


$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_A \quad x : A' \quad \mathcal{D}_B}{A : s_1 \quad B : s_2} \textcircled{(\textcircled{IF})} \right] = \frac{[\mathcal{D}_A] \quad x : A' \quad [\mathcal{D}_B]}{A' : s_1 \quad B' : s_2} \textcircled{(\textcircled{IF})}$$

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_A \quad x : A' \quad \mathcal{D}_M}{A : s_1 \quad M : B} \textcircled{(\textcircled{III})} \right] = \frac{[\mathcal{D}_A] \quad x : A' \quad [\mathcal{D}_M]}{A' : s_1 \quad M' : B'} \textcircled{(\textcircled{III})}$$

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_M \quad \mathcal{D}_N}{M : (x : A) \rightarrow B \quad N : A} \textcircled{(\textcircled{IE})} \right] = \frac{[\mathcal{D}_M] \quad [\mathcal{D}_N]}{M' : (x : A') \rightarrow B' \quad N' : A'} \textcircled{(\textcircled{IE})}$$

where  $B'[N'/x] \rightarrow_{\beta} B''$

# The model of language understanding



# Beyond Truth-conditions

## Anaphoric potential


The sentences (15a) and (16a) are truth-conditionally equivalent (cf.  $\exists x(\mathbf{L}x \wedge \mathbf{R}x) \equiv \neg\forall x(\mathbf{L}x \rightarrow \neg\mathbf{R}x)$ ), while they show the different *anaphoric potential* to the subsequent sentences.

- (15) a. Some linguist is rich.  
b. He/She does not even have to teach.
- (16) a. It is not the case that no linguist is rich.  
b. \* He/She does not even have to teach.

Therefore, truth-conditional semantics is not enough for distinguishing a certain aspect of the meaning of sentences. (Kamp et al. (2011))


# Anaphoric potential in DRT

*Some linguist is rich.  
 He/she does not even  
 have to teach.*



$x$  is accessible from  $z$ .

*It is not the case that no linguist is rich.  
 \*He/she does not even have to teach.*



$x$  is not accessible from  $z$ .

## Anaphoric potential in DTS

Some linguist is rich.  
He/she does not even  
have to teach.

$$\left[ \begin{array}{l} u: \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:\text{entity} \\ \left[ \begin{array}{l} L(x) \\ R(x) \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right] \\ \neg\text{HTT}(\text{@}_1\text{entity}) \end{array} \right]$$

$$\text{@}_1\text{entity} = \pi_1 u$$

It is not the case that no linguist is rich.  
He/she does not even have to teach.

$$\left[ \begin{array}{l} u: \neg(x : \text{entity}) \rightarrow L(x) \rightarrow \neg R(x) \\ \neg\text{HTT}(\text{@}_1\text{entity}) \end{array} \right]$$

$$\text{@}_1\text{entity} = ??$$



## Anaphoric potential in DTS

However, if the following inference had a proof term  $f u$ , then the anaphoric link in question would be wrongly predicted to be licenced.

$$u : \neg(x : \text{entity}) \rightarrow \mathbf{L}(x) \rightarrow \neg\mathbf{R}(x) \vdash \left[ \begin{array}{c} x:\text{entity} \\ \mathbf{L}(x) \\ \mathbf{R}(x) \end{array} \right] \text{true}$$

**Proof search:**

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{}{\text{entity} : \text{type}} \text{ (CON)}}{\frac{f u : \left[ \begin{array}{c} x:\text{entity} \\ \mathbf{L}(x) \\ \mathbf{R}(x) \end{array} \right]}{\pi_1(f u) : \text{entity}} \text{ (\Sigma E)}}{\text{entity} : \text{type}} \text{ (CON)}}{\text{entity} : \text{type}} \text{ (CON)} \quad \frac{u : \neg(x : \text{entity}) \rightarrow \mathbf{L}(x) \rightarrow \neg\mathbf{R}(x)}{\pi_1(f u) : \text{entity}} \text{ (\Sigma E)} \quad ?}{\text{entity} : \text{type}} \text{ (@)}$$

$@_1 \text{entity} : \text{entity}$

Proof of  $u : \neg((x : e) \rightarrow Lx \rightarrow \neg Rx) \vdash \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:e \\ Lx \\ Rx \end{array} \right] \text{ true}$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{\frac{\frac{l : Lx^2 \quad r : Rx^1}{(SI)} \quad (l, r) : \left[ \begin{array}{l} Lx \\ Rx \end{array} \right]}{(SI)} \quad \frac{x : e^3}{(x, (l, r)) : \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:e \\ Lx \\ Rx \end{array} \right]} \quad \frac{}{y : \neg \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:e \\ Lx \\ Rx \end{array} \right]}^4}{(\rightarrow E)} \\
 \frac{y(x, (l, r)) : \perp}{\lambda r. y(x, (l, r)) : \neg Rx}^{(\neg I),1} \\
 \frac{\lambda r. y(x, (l, r)) : \neg Rx}{\lambda x. \lambda l. \lambda r. y(x, (l, r)) : Lx \rightarrow \neg Rx}^{(\rightarrow I),2} \\
 \frac{u : \neg((x : e) \rightarrow Lx \rightarrow \neg Rx) \quad \lambda x. \lambda l. \lambda r. y(x, (l, r)) : (x : e) \rightarrow Lx \rightarrow \neg Rx}{u(\lambda x. \lambda l. \lambda r. y(x, (l, r))) : \perp}^{(III),3} \\
 \frac{u(\lambda x. \lambda l. \lambda r. y(x, (l, r))) : \perp}{\lambda y. u(\lambda x. \lambda l. \lambda r. y(x, (l, r))) : \neg \neg \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:e \\ Lx \\ Rx \end{array} \right]}^{(\neg I),4} \\
 \frac{\lambda y. u(\lambda x. \lambda l. \lambda r. y(x, (l, r))) : \neg \neg \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:e \\ Lx \\ Rx \end{array} \right]}{\text{dne}(\lambda y. u(\lambda x. \lambda l. \lambda r. y(x, (l, r)))) : \left[ \begin{array}{l} x:e \\ Lx \\ Rx \end{array} \right]}^{(DNE)}
 \end{array}$$

**Proof of**  $u : \neg((x : \text{entity}) \rightarrow \mathbf{L}x \rightarrow \neg\mathbf{R}x) \vdash \left[ \begin{array}{c} x:\text{entity} \\ \mathbf{L}x \\ \mathbf{R}x \end{array} \right] \text{true}$

- ▶ This does not hold in *intuitionistic* settings, such as DTT and DTS.
- ▶ It requires *classical* settings, such as DTT/DTS+(DNE)-rule

$$\frac{M : \neg\neg A}{\text{dne}(M) : A} \text{ (DNE)}$$

## Proof-theoretic hierarchy

$$NK = NM + \text{DNE (i.e. } \neg\neg A \rightarrow A)$$

$$NK = NJ + \text{LEM (i.e. } \neg A \vee A)$$

$$NJ = NM + \text{EFQ (i.e. } \perp \rightarrow A)$$

(15a) Some linguist is rich.

(16a) It is not the case that no linguist is rich.

- ▶ The difference in anaphoric potentials of (15a) and (16a) is due to the fact that
  - ▶ (15a)  $\vdash_{NM}$  (16a)
  - ▶ (16a)  $\vdash_{NK}$  (15a)are theorems of different proof systems.
- ▶ Proof-theoretic semantics provides a distinction between truth-conditionally equivalent propositions.

## A toilet in a funny place

Similar argument applies to the following case discussed in Karttunen (1976), Krahmer and Muskens (1995), Geurts (1999):

- (17) a. Either there is no toilet, or it is in a funny place.

If disjunction in DTT is defined (instead of  $\uplus$ ) as

$A \vee B \stackrel{def}{\equiv} \neg A \rightarrow B$ , then we can deduce “there is a toilet” from a doubly-negated form “ $\neg\neg$  there is a toilet” (Bekki, 2013)

## A toilet in a funny place

However, this analysis is not on a right track, since it predicts that the following anaphoric link is licenced if the use of `dne` is allowed in DTS, which is not the case.

(18) It is not the case that `nobody` showed up.

\* `He/she` was sitting alone.

Thus we need the other analysis for this case. But the following cases implies that we have to be careful about the status of the original paradigm:

(19) Either `John is not married`, or \* `she` is not home right now.

(20) It is not the case that there is `no toilet` in this building.

Actually, `it` is in a funny place.

## Hidden marbles

A well-known example showing that “discourse referents are not introduced solely by inferences”. (by Barbara Partee, due to Heim (1982))

(21) Nine balls out of ten are found in the bag. \*It must be under the sofa.

We should reconsider this case from a proof-theoretic perspective whether (21) can be proven in a intuitionistic setting.

There are exactly ten balls.

Exactly nine balls are found.

---

?? There is a ball that is not found.

In this way, DTS provides a new perspective that differentiates the status of various constructions from the viewpoint of proof-theory.

# Concluding Remarks



# Compositional Theory of Anaphora

- ▶ DTS provides a unified analysis for (general) inferences and anaphora resolution mechanisms (at least) for:
  - ▶ Deictic use and coreference
  - ▶ Bound variable anaphora (BVA)
  - ▶ E-type anaphora
  - ▶ Donkey anaphora
  - ▶ Bridging anaphora
  - ▶ Syllogistic anaphora
  - ▶ Disjunctive antecedents

# Compositional Theory of Anaphora

- ▶ The background theory for DTS is an extension of DTT with underspecified terms and the @-rule .
  - ▶ Lexical items of anaphoric expressions and presupposition triggers are represented by using underspecified terms.
  - ▶ Context retrieval in DTS reduces to type checking .
  - ▶ Anaphora resolution and presupposition binding in DTS reduces to proof search .
  - ▶ @-elimination translates a proof diagram of DTS into a proof diagram of DTT, by which an SR in DTT is obtained with all anaphora resolved.

# Natural language semantics via dependent types: Classics

- ▶ Donkey anaphora: Sundholm (1986)
- ▶ Translation from DRS to dependent type representations: Ahn and Kolb (1990)
- ▶ Summation: Fox (1994a,b)
- ▶ Ranta's TTG (Relative and Implicational Donkey Sentences, Branching Quantifiers, Intensionality, Tense): Ranta (1994)
- ▶ Translation from Montague Grammar to dependent type representations: Dávila-Pérez (1995)
- ▶ Presupposition Binding and Accommodation, Bridging: Krahmer and Piwek (1999), Piwek and Krahmer (2000)

# Natural language semantics via dependent types:


## Recent frameworks

- ▶ Type Theory with Record (TTR): Cooper (2005)
- ▶ Modern Type Theory: Luo (1997, 1999, 2010, 2012), Asher and Luo (2012), Chatzikyriakidis (2014)
- ▶ Semantics with Dependent Types: Grudzinska and Zawadowski (2014; 2017)
- ▶ **Dependent Type Semantics (DTS): Bekki (2014), Bekki and Mineshima (2017)**
- ▶ (Dynamic Categorical Grammar: Martin and Pollard (2014))

## Semantic Analyses by DTS

- ▶ Generalized Quantifiers: Tanaka (2014)
- ▶ Honorification: Watanabe et al. (2014)
- ▶ Conventional Implicature: Bekki and McCready (2015)
- ▶ Factive Presuppositions: Tanaka et al. (2015)(2017)
- ▶ Dependent Plural Anaphora: Tanaka et al. (2017)
- ▶ Paycheck sentences: Tanaka et al. (2018) in NLCS2018 (July 7)
- ▶ Comparison with DRT: Yana et al. (forthcoming)
- ▶ Social meaning of accommodation: Ito et al. (forthcoming)
- ▶ Coercion and Metaphor: Kinoshita et al. (forthcoming)

Thank you!



# Typing Rules in DTS

## Axioms and Structural Rules

$$\frac{A : \text{type}_i}{x : A} \text{ (VAR)} \quad \frac{(c : A) \in \sigma}{c : A} \text{ (CON)} \quad \frac{}{\text{type}_i : \text{type}_{i+1}} \text{ (typeF)}$$

$$\frac{M : A \quad N : B}{M : A} \text{ (WK)} \quad \frac{M : A \quad A =_{\beta} B}{M : B} \text{ (CONV)}$$



## Π-type F/I/E rules

$$\frac{\frac{\overline{x : A}^k \quad \vdots}{A : \text{type}_i \quad B : \text{type}_j}}{(x : A) \rightarrow B : \text{type}_{\max(i,j)}} \quad (\Pi F),k$$

$$\frac{\frac{\overline{x : A}^k \quad \vdots}{A : \text{type}_i \quad M : B}}{\lambda x.M : (x : A) \rightarrow B} \quad (\Pi I),k$$

$$\frac{M : (x : A) \rightarrow B \quad N : A}{MN : B[N/x]} \quad (\Pi E)$$

## $\Sigma$ -type F/I/E rules

$$\frac{\frac{\overline{x : A}^k \quad \vdots}{A : \text{type}_i \quad B : \text{type}_j}}{(x : A) \times B : \text{type}_{\max(i,j)}} (\Sigma F), k$$

$$\frac{M : A \quad N : B[M/x]}{(M, N) : (x : A) \times B} (\Sigma I)$$

$$\frac{M : (x : A) \times B}{\pi_1(M) : A} (\Sigma E)$$

$$\frac{M : (x : A) \times B}{\pi_2(M) : B[\pi_1(M)/x]} (\Sigma E)$$

## Disjoint Union Type F/I/E rules

$$\frac{A : \text{type} \quad B : \text{type}}{A \uplus B : \text{type}} (\uplus F)$$

$$\frac{M : A}{\iota_1(M) : A \uplus B} (\uplus I)$$

$$\frac{N : B}{\iota_2(N) : A \uplus B} (\uplus I)$$

$$\frac{L : A \uplus B \quad C : (A \uplus B) \rightarrow \text{type} \quad \begin{array}{c} \frac{}{x : A} \quad k \\ \vdots \\ M : C(\iota_1(x)) \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \frac{}{x : B} \quad k \\ \vdots \\ N : C(\iota_2(x)) \end{array}}{\text{case of } (L; \lambda x. M) \lambda x. N : C(L)} (\uplus E)$$

## Natural Number Type F/I/E rules

$$\frac{}{\mathbb{N} : \text{type}} \text{ (NF)}$$

$$\frac{}{0 : \mathbb{N}} \text{ (NI)} \quad \frac{n : \mathbb{N}}{s(n) : \mathbb{N}} \text{ (NI)}$$

$$\frac{n : \mathbb{N} \quad C : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{type} \quad e : C(0) \quad \begin{array}{c} \overline{x : \mathbb{N}^k} \quad \overline{y : C(x)^k} \\ \vdots \quad \quad \quad \vdots \\ M : C(s(x)) \end{array}}{\text{natrec}(n, e, \lambda x. \lambda y. M) : C(n)} \text{ (NE),k}$$

# Enumeration Type F/I/E rules

$$\frac{}{\{a_1, \dots, a_n\} : \text{type}} \quad (\{\}F)$$

$$\frac{}{a_i : \{a_1, \dots, a_n\}} \quad (\{\}I)$$

$$\frac{M : \{a_1, \dots, a_n\} \quad C : \{a_1, \dots, a_n\} \rightarrow \text{type} \quad N_1 : C(a_1) \quad \dots \quad N_n : C(a_n)}{\text{case}_M(N_1, \dots, N_n) : C(M)} \quad (\{\}E)$$

# Intensional Equality Type F/I/E rules

$$\frac{A : s \quad M : A \quad N : A}{M =_A N : \text{type}} \text{ (IdF)}$$

$$\frac{A : \text{type} \quad M : A}{\text{refl}_A(M) : M =_A M} \text{ (IdI)}$$

$$\frac{E : M_1 =_A M_2 \quad C : (x : A) \rightarrow (y : A) \rightarrow (x =_A y) \rightarrow \text{type} \quad N : (x : A) \rightarrow C x x (\text{refl}_A(x))}{\text{idpeel}(e, N) : C M_1 M_2 E}$$

# @-rule

$$\frac{A : \text{type} \quad A \text{ true}}{\textcircled{A}_i : A} \text{ (@)}$$

# @-Elimination Rules in DTS



# Axioms

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_M \quad A : s \quad M : A'}{\textcircled{i}A : A} (@) \right] = \mathcal{D}_M \quad M : A'$$

$$\left[ \frac{}{c : A} (\underline{CON}) \right] = \frac{}{c : A} (CON)$$

$$\left[ x : A \right] = x : A$$

$$\left[ \frac{}{\text{type} : \text{kind}} (\underline{\text{type}F}) \right] = \frac{}{\text{type} : \text{kind}} (\text{type}F)$$

## Π-type

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_A \quad x : A' \quad \mathcal{D}_B}{A : s_1 \quad B : s_2} \text{(ΠF)} \right] = \frac{[\mathcal{D}_A] \quad [\mathcal{D}_B]}{A' : s_1 \quad B' : s_2} \text{(ΠF)}$$

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_A \quad x : A' \quad \mathcal{D}_M}{\lambda x.M : (x : A) \rightarrow B} \text{(ΠI)} \right] = \frac{[\mathcal{D}_A] \quad [\mathcal{D}_M]}{\lambda x.M' : (x : A') \rightarrow B'} \text{(ΠI)}$$

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_M \quad \mathcal{D}_N}{M : (x : A) \rightarrow B \quad N : A} \text{(ΠE)} \right] = \frac{[\mathcal{D}_M] \quad [\mathcal{D}_N]}{M'N' : B'} \text{(ΠE)}$$

where  $B'[N'/x] \rightarrow_{\beta} B''$

# $\Sigma$ -type

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_A \quad \mathcal{D}_B \quad x:A' \quad A:s_1 \quad B:s_2}{\left[ \begin{array}{c} x:A \\ B \end{array} \right] : s_2} (\Sigma F)} \right] = \frac{\left[ \mathcal{D}_A \right] \quad \left[ \mathcal{D}_B \right] \quad A':s_1 \quad B':s_2}{\left[ \begin{array}{c} x:A' \\ B' \end{array} \right] : s_2} (\Sigma F)$$

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_M \quad \mathcal{D}_N \quad M:A \quad N:B' \quad (M,N) : \left[ \begin{array}{c} x:A \\ B \end{array} \right]}{(\Sigma I)} \right] = \frac{\left[ \mathcal{D}_M \right] \quad \left[ \mathcal{D}_N \right] \quad M':A' \quad N':B''}{(M',N') : \left[ \begin{array}{c} x:A' \\ B'' \end{array} \right]} (\Sigma I)$$

*where  $B''[M'/x] \rightarrow_{\beta} B'''$*

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_M \quad M : \left[ \begin{array}{c} x:A \\ B \end{array} \right]}{\pi_1(M) : A} (\Sigma E) \right] = \frac{\left[ \mathcal{D}_M \right] \quad M' : \left[ \begin{array}{c} x:A' \\ B' \end{array} \right]}{\pi_1(M') : A'} (\Sigma E)$$

$$\left[ \frac{\mathcal{D}_M \quad M : \left[ \begin{array}{c} x:A \\ B \end{array} \right]}{\pi_2(M) : B'} (\Sigma E) \right] = \frac{\left[ \mathcal{D}_M \right] \quad M' : \left[ \begin{array}{c} x:A' \\ B'' \end{array} \right]}{\pi_2(M') : B''} (\Sigma E)$$

*where  $B''[\pi_1(M')/x] \rightarrow_{\beta} B'''$*

## Reference |

- Ahn, R. and H.-P. Kolb. (1990) Discourse Representation meets Constructive Mathematics. Akademiai Kiado.
- Asher, N. and Z. Luo. (2012) “Formalisation of coercions in lexical semantics”, In the Proceedings of *Sinn und Bedeutung 17*. pp.63–80.
- Bekki, D. (2013) “A Type-theoretic Approach to Double Negation Elimination in Anaphora”, In the Proceedings of *Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics 10 (LENLS 10)*.
- Bekki, D. (2014) “Representing Anaphora with Dependent Types”, In the Proceedings of N. Asher and S. V. Soloviev (eds.): *Logical Aspects of Computational Linguistics (8th international conference, LACL2014, Toulouse, France, June 2014 Proceedings)*, LNCS 8535. pp.14–29, Springer, Heiderburg.

## Reference II

- Bekki, D. and E. McCready. (2015) CI via DTS, Vol. LNAI 9067, pp.23–36. Springer.
- Bekki, D. and K. Mineshima. (2017) Context-passing and Underspecification in Dependent Type Semantics, p.33 pages, Studies of Linguistics and Philosophy. Springer.
- Chatzikyriakidis, S. (2014) Adverbs in a Modern Type Theory. Springer.
- Cooper, R. (2005) “Austinian truth, attitudes and type theory”, *Research on Language and Computation* **3**, pp.333–362.
- Dávila-Pérez, R. (1995) “Semantics and Parsing in Intuitionistic Categorical Grammar”, Ph.d. thesis.
- Elbourne, P. (2011) *Meaning: A Slim Guide to Semantics*. Oxford University Press.

## Reference III

- Evans, G. (1980) “Pronouns”, *Linguistic Inquiry* **11**, pp.337–362.
- Fischer, M. and R. Ladner. (1977) “Propositional Modal Logics of programs”, In the Proceedings of *9th ACM Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing*. pp.286–294.
- Fox, C. (1994a) “Discourse Representation, Type Theory and Property Theory”, In the Proceedings of H. Bunt, R. Muskens, and G. Rentier (eds.): *the International Workshop on Computational Semantics*. pp.71–80.
- Fox, C. (1994b) “Existence Presuppositions and Category Mistakes”, *Acta Linguistica Hungarica* **42**(3/4), pp.325–339.
- Geach, P. (1962) *Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories*. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press.
- Geurts, B. (1999) *Presuppositions and pronouns*. Elsevier, Oxford.

## Reference IV

- Groenendijk, J. and M. Stokhof. (1991) “Dynamic Predicate Logic”, *Linguistics and Philosophy* **14**, pp.39–100.
- Harel, D. (1979) *First-Order Dynamic Logic*, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer.
- Heim, I. (1982) “The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases”, Ph.d dissertation.
- Kamp, H. and U. Reyle. (1993) *From Discourse to Logic*. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Kamp, H., J. van Genabith, and U. Reyle. (2011) *Discourse Representation Theory*, Vol. 15, pp.125–394. Dordrecht, Springer.
- Karttunen, L. (1976) *Discourse Referents*, Vol. 7, pp.363–85. New York, Academic Press.

## Reference V

- Krahmer, E. and R. Muskens. (1995) “Negation and Disjunction in Discourse Representation Theory”, *Journal of Semantics* **12**(4), pp.357–376.
- Krahmer, E. and P. Piwek. (1999) *Presupposition Projection as Proof Construction*, Studies in Linguistics Philosophy Series. Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Luo, Z. (1997) *Coercive subtyping in type theory*. Heidelberg, Springer.
- Luo, Z. (1999) “Coercive subtyping”, *Journal of Logic and Computation* **9**(1), pp.105–130.
- Luo, Z. (2010) “Type-theoretical semantics with coercive subtyping”, In the Proceedings of *Semantics and Linguistic Theory 20 (SALT 20)*.



## Reference VI

- Luo, Z. (2012) “Formal Semantics in Modern Type Theories with Coercive Subtyping”, *Linguistics and Philosophy* **35**(6).
- Martin, S. and C. J. Pollard. (2014) “A dynamic categorial grammar”, In the Proceedings of *Formal Grammar 19, LNCS 8612*.
- Piwek, P. and E. Kraemer. (2000) *Presuppositions in Context: Constructing Bridges*, Applied Logic Series. Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Postal, P. (1971) *Cross-over Phenomena*. New York, Holt, Reinhart and Winston.
- Ranta, A. (1994) *Type-Theoretical Grammar*. Oxford University Press.
- Sundholm, G. (1986) *Proof theory and meaning*, Vol. III, pp.471–506. Reidel, Kluwer.

## Reference VII

- Tanaka, R. (2014) “A Proof-Theoretic Approach to Generalized Quantifiers in Dependent Type Semantics”, In the Proceedings of R. de Haan (ed.): *the ESSLLI 2014 Student Session, 26th European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information*. pp.140–151.
- Tanaka, R., K. Mineshima, and D. Bekki. (2015) “Factivity and Presupposition in Dependent Type Semantics”, In the Proceedings of *TYpe Theory and LExical Semantics (TYTTLES), ESSLLI2015 workshop*.
- Watanabe, N., E. McCready, and D. Bekki. (2014) “Japanese Honorification: Compositionality and Expressivity”, In the Proceedings of S. Kawahara and M. Igarashi (eds.): *FAJL 7: Formal Approaches to Japanese Linguistics, the MIT Working Papers in Linguistics 73*. pp.265–276.